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Moral Rights Protection in the United
States and the Effect of the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2005 on U.S. International Obligations
ABSTRACT

Alteration of a motion picture has become legal as a result
of the Family Movie Act, an attachment to the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act approved by Congress and
signed by the President in early-2005. The "family movie"
provision, championed by U.S. Representative Lamar Smith,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Internet and
Intellectual Property Subcommittee, indemnifies any company
that makes filtered versions of movies without authorization
from the copyright owners. Proponents claim the bill is a way to
put content-filtering back into the hands of individual families,
while critics claim their copyrights are violated whenever a
company redistributestheir work for profit. At issue in this Note
is this controversial law in relation to the United States'
internationalobligations. The Family Movie Act appears to be
contrary to our international obligations because it does not
require the permission of the content creator or owner, but
rather creates an exemption from copyright and trademark
liability for filtering. The Author argues that there is a
difference between enacting legislation that permits persons
other than creators or authorized distributors of a motion
picture profit from content filtration and a scheme that allows
individuals, in the privacy of their own homes, to filter out
undesired content. In fact, allowing a for-profit company to
commercially market a product that alters an artist or copyright
owner's artistic vision is a violation of moral rights-rights of
the creators of the copyrighted works. The United States, as a
party to the Berne Convention, is obligated to uphold and
protect the moral rights of an artist. The Author further argues
that the United States has historically provided inadequate
protection to moral rights and that it should withdraw from the
Berne Convention, accepting any associated sanctions.
Otherwise, by disguising its minimal protections of moral
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rights, the United States seriously misleads foreign artists who
desire to publish or distribute their works in the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many countries in continental Europe recognize that authors
and artists have legal interests in their work that exist independently
of the legal interest created by copyright laws. These legal interests
remain with the author or artist even after the copyright is
transferred to another party and the work is no longer in the hands of
the author or artist. Among these legally recognized interests are four
distinct rights that are collectively known as authors' and artists'
"moral rights."1 These moral rights include: (1) the right of integrity,
under which the artists can prevent alterations in their work; (2) the
right of attribution or paternity, under which the artists can insist
that their work be distributed or displayed only if their name is
connected with it; (3) the right of disclosure, under which the artists
can refuse to expose their work to the public before they feel it is
satisfactory; and (4) the right of retraction or withdrawal, under
which the artists can withdraw their work even after it has left their
hands. 2 For civil law countries, 3 moral rights are inalienable. In
contrast, common law countries such as the United States historically
have not recognized the collective moral rights as a legal interest. 4 By
ignoring the legality of moral rights, the United States effectively
renders unenforceable any attempt by an artist to retain such rights
in a creation after transferring ownership of their work. In effect, the
United States views moral rights as non-economic rights of the artist
5
or author.

1.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art,
6bis, July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/
berne/6bis.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9,
1886, S.TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986).
2.
See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural
Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22
COLUM. -VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 368-70 (1998) (categorizing four distinct moral rights).
3.
Civil law countries are those such as Germany, France and Spain. Adolf
Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 200 (1995).
4.
See Swack, supra note 2, at 380.
5.
See Stuart Kauffman, Note, Motion Pictures, Moral Rights, and the
Incentive Theory of Copyright: The Independent Film Producer as "Author", 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 749, 754 (1999).
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There is an important distinction between an artist's economic
rights and an artist's moral rights when related to copyright
protection.6 This distinction presents a basic divergence between the
intellectual property law regimes found in civil law countries and
those found in the common law countries like the United States. 7 The
debate and controversy increased in recent years as the United States
and the European Community struggled to determine whose policies
concerning intellectual property would dominate the international
legal order.8 An important focus of this controversy concerns the
Berne Convention on Copyright. Originally drafted in 1886, the Berne
Convention requires that signatory countries provide protection for
moral rights, particularly the rights of paternity and integrity.9 For
more than 100 years, the United States refused to sign the Berne
Convention, because it disagreed with the protections afforded by the
moral rights clause.' 0 In 1989, the United States reversed its position
and signed the Berne Convention, 1 claiming that U.S. law had
evolved to the point where it could provide the minimal protection for
12
artists' moral rights required by the Convention.
As the new millennium emerges, the growth of technology and
the internet has made it difficult to define the moral rights of artists,
especially across the international marketplace. Often the difficult
issue is determining whether there has been a violation of an artist's
moral rights or whether a particular use of the artist's work is an
exemption from violation. The United States recently enacted
legislation that exempts many actions deemed by artists as
infringements and violations of moral rights. This legislation-the
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 200513-is comprised of
four independent laws, including the law at issue in this Note, the
Family Movie Act of 2005 (FMA). 14 The FMA amends federal
copyright law to create an exemption from copyright infringement for:
(1) the act of rendering imperceptible portions of audio or video

6.

Berne Convention, supra note 1.

7.

See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author

Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1, 2, 26, 29 (1994) (discussing a distinction between civil law and common law
countries).
8.
Leslie A. Pettenati, Moral Rights of Artists in an InternationalMarketplace,
12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 425, 435-36 (2000).

9.
Id. at 438-39.
10.
Id. at 439.
11.
The signing of the treaty followed congressional passage of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
12.
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 33-34 (1988).
13.
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119
Stat. 218 (2005).
14.
Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, tit. II, 119 Stat. 218 (2005)
[hereinafter FMA].

20061

MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STA TES

221

content in movies by or for the owner or lawful possessor of
authorized copies of such movies in the course of private home
viewing; and (2) the use of technologies allowing such movie content
to be rendered imperceptible where the technology does not create a
15
copy of the altered version.
FMA directly addresses copyright and trademark issues and also
16
legalizes technologies such as those sold by ClearPlay, Inc.
ClearPlay employees review motion pictures and create software
filters that remove offensive scenes and audio from movies. This
process occurs without notice to or permission from the original
17
authors, copyright owners (movie studios), or movie directors.
Essentially, artists argue that ClearPlay makes derivative works in
violation of the Copyright Act"8 and that ClearPlay's editing software
violates artists' moral rights by allowing lawful possessors (home
viewers) to make modifications or other derivations from the original
movies. 19 When Congress enacted FMA, the bill amended the
Copyright Act and clarified the legality of movie filtering in the
privacy of homes via personal DVD-players. 20 This amendment,
however, fails to adequately protect moral rights and thus violates
U.S. obligations under the Berne Copyright Convention, 21 a violation
22
that is actionable under the WTO's TRIPs provisions.
Part II of this Note presents an overview of the moral rights
doctrine and discusses the historical and theoretical development of
the doctrine in Europe, its treatment in the United States, and its
relation to the Berne Convention. Part III of this Note examines the
regimes under U.S. laws that purport to protect moral rights and

15.
Family Movie Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProperty of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.
9 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4586, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/
pdfs/printers108th94286.pdf.
16.
ClearPlay is a software company that provides filtering technology. See
ClearPlay: The Technology of Choice, http://www.clearplay.com/About.aspx (last visited
Oct. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ClearPlay Services]. This technology can either be
downloaded to work with an individual's own DVD-player as an added filtering feature
or comes in the form of an actual ClearPlay enabled DVD-player which can be
purchased through ClearPlay. See id.
17.
Hearing on H.R. 4586, supra note 15, at 69 (explaining that these
technologies create "family friendly" versions of movies without the copyright owner's
permission).
18.
Id.
19.
Id. ClearPlay has fourteen filter settings. Id. at 73-74.
20.
Backgrounder on the Family Movie Act, http://www.grassfire.org/39/
backgrounder.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2005).
21.
See Berne Convention, supra note 1.
22.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 346-47, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1221 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/27-trips.pdf.
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comply with the Berne Convention. Part IV of this Note analyzes the
impact of FIA, the dealings and procedures of companies like
ClearPlay, and whether the U.S. will still meet its international
obligations as a signatory to the Berne Convention. Part V of this
Note concludes that the United States' compliance with the Berne
Convention was already fragile, and enactment of FIA will most
surely place the United States in violation of its duty to protect moral
rights as a member of the Berne Convention and the WTO.

II.

THE HISTORY AND INFLUENCE OF THE MORAL RIGHTS

A. The Origins of the Moral Rights Doctrine
In the late-fifteenth century, the introduction of the printing
press to England spurred the beginning of a movement to protect
authors from having their work duplicated. As the number of presses
increased, so did unauthorized copying of authors' works. 23 The
authorities sought to control the unauthorized duplication by
granting publishers a near monopoly. 24 A confirmation of the
monopoly given to publishers occurred through Parliament's
codification of the Licensing Act of 1662 (Licensing Act). The
Licensing Act established a register of licensed books that could only
be administered and distributed by the Stationer's Company. 25 The
Stationer's Company comprised a group of printers who often utilized
their legal powers to censor publications. 26 The Stationer's Company
developed its own internal system for regulating competition, now
known as Stationer's copyright, 27 effectively a private copyright

23.

Kelly Campbell, It's the Law: Keeping Abreast of Copyright Law Can Keep

You Out of Hot Water, May 2004, http://www.copyright.comlmedia/pdfs/article-0407.pdf.
24.
See, for example, the research collected by the Association of Research
Libraries in, Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States,
http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/timeline.html [hereinafter Timeline] (this historical
data is compiled by American Research Libraries, which is a non-profit organization
that reports on current issues of interest to academic and research library
administrators, staff, and education professionals). "In economics, a monopoly . . . is
defined as a persistent market situation where there is only one provider of a product
or service." Wikipedia, Monopoly, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopoly. The character
of a monopoly is illustrated by a lack of competition for the good or service at issue. Id.
25.
Timeline, supra note 24.
26.
Id.
27.
Wikipedia, History of Copyright, § 1.1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
History-of copyright (last modified Nov. 7, 2005). Wikipedia is a free content
encyclopedia written collaboratively by people from all around the world. See
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system made enforceable by the Stationers' monopoly. 28 Essentially,
the Licensing Act proved an effective, yet rudimentary, way to

establish legal consequences for those who would publish or duplicate
unauthorized works.
Although the Licensing Act attempted to provide fundamental

protections of authors' work from fraudulent duplication, it lapsed
after just three years due to the alleged abuse of the monopoly by the
Stationer's Company. 29 The lapse of the Licensing Act dramatically
relaxed the government's censorship standards and hurt not only the
Stationer's Company but also the authors.30 In response to outcries
31
from both groups, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne in 1710.
The Statute of Anne served to placate concerns of both the English

booksellers and printers. 32 In addition, the Statute of Anne was the
first true copyright protection and gave an author rights for a fixed

period.

33

The Statute

of Anne established

the foundation

of authors'

ownership of their creation and a fixed term of protection for
copyrighted works. 34 The Statute of Anne provided two kinds of
copyright. For past works, it extended the Stationer's copyright for a
period of twenty-one years. 35 For future works, it gave the author the
exclusive

right

to print

the

work

for

fourteen

years,

with

the

Wikipedia, FAQ, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiWikipedia:OverviewFAQ (last modified
Nov. 12, 2005). The site is a "wiki," which means that anyone can edit articles. Id.
28.
Wikipedia, History of Copyright, supra note 27.
[Tlhe stationer's copyright was literally a right to copy-that is, a right to
reproduce a given work for sale. The basic purpose of this right was to provide
order for the book trade by establishing a method to enable publishers to have
the exclusive right to publish a work without competition as to that work. And
the sanctions for copyright came from the company, for it was the company, not
the author, which granted the copyright.
LYMAN R. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 71 (1968).

29.
See PATTERSON, supra note 28, at 61, 115; Press Release, Federation of
European Film Directors, FERA Defends the Creative Rights of Every Nation, Oct. 18,
2002, available at http://www.aidaa.org/fera/cdep/181002en.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).

30.
See PATTERSON, supra note 28, at 71.
31.
The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.), available at
http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. The Statute of Anne was the first British
copyright law, enacted in 1709 and entering into force in 1710. Id. The statute is
generally considered to be the first fully-fledged copyright law. Id. The Statute was
also reprinted in WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1461-64 (1994)
and in PATTERSON, supra note 28, at 143.
32.
The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
33.
Id.
34.
Id. Protection was for fourteen years and renewable for fourteen more if the
author was alive upon expiration of the original protection. Id.
35.
Id.; see also Wikipedia, Statute of Anne, pt. I, http://wikisource.org/wiki
Statute of Anne (last modified Nov. 7, 2005).
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stipulation that the right was renewable by an author for another
fourteen years. 36 Two influential changes occurred with the passing
of the Statute of Anne by Parliament. First, the statute allowed
37
people outside the Stationer's Company to hold the copyright.
Second, the statute attempted to break the monopoly of the
Stationers by limiting the term of copyright-a radical change for the
Stationers, who until then had enjoyed perpetual copyright. 38 The
Statute prevented the Stationers from having a monopoly where they
could control the market for an author's work. 39 Although initially
lacking political support, the Statute of Anne was a fundamental
40
change in the right direction.
Under the old theory of copyright based on the England privilege
system, there were competing views on copyright protection held by
booksellers, such as the Stationer's Company and authors. The
booksellers justified copyright on economic grounds. 4 1 They had a
pecuniary interest and needed exclusive rights to an author's work so
they could make an adequate profit and cover the costs of a printing
press and the author's manuscripts. 42 For these reasons the
booksellers were outraged when the Statute of Anne affected the term
limit on copyrights. Even though the Statute restored order to the
trade, it also fundamentally changed the nature of the booksellers'
monopoly. Hence the booksellers fought back by adopting a competing
strategy that the authors previously lobbied for themselves. 4 3 Their
strategy focused on the theory that authors had a natural right to
protect their own ideas. 44 If authors owned the works they created,
then they would own a perpetual property right. Because property
rights are transferable, authors could theoretically assign their
copyright to the booksellers and circumvent the restrictions of the
Statute of Anne. This natural rights theory became an effective
strategy that was successful in both the eyes of the booksellers and
the authors; authors had a natural right to ownership. 45 With a

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Parts II.B-III.C.

41.

Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the

Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (1988).
42.
Id.
43.

See PATTERSON, supra note 28, at 140-58.

44.
Id. Both the United States and Great Britain, however, initially rejected
this idea. See Burger, supra note 41, at 5.
45.
PATTERSON, supra note 28, at 140-51.
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majority of the trade lobbying for one theory, the natural rights
46
approach quickly spread to other countries.
Although most of the natural rights history stems from England,
France was one of the first countries to codify the natural rights
approach. 4 7 France recognized that an artist has, in addition to an
economic interest, a natural right to the qualities that the artist
instills at the work's creation. These qualities remain part of the work
48
despite the artist's physical relinquishment of the object to others.
These qualities collectively constitute an author's droit moral or
moral right. Moral rights collectively represent four different rights:
(1) the right of integrity, under which the artist can prevent
alterations of his work; (2) the right of attribution or paternity, under
which the artist can insist that his work be distributed or displayed
only when his name is connected with it; (3) the right of disclosure,
under which the artist can refuse to expose his work to the public
before he feels it is satisfactory; and (4) the right of retraction or
withdrawal, under which the artist can withdraw his work even after
49
it has left his hands.
The evolution of the natural rights approach reflected a
completely new conception of copyright. The difference between the
natural rights approach and the traditional economic rights approach
reflected an international difference between countries and the rights
they afforded their artists. National borders did not constrain natural
rights theories and most of the countries supporting this ideology
extended their laws not only to their own artists but also to artists of
50
foreign countries.
As most of continental Europe began to adopt the natural rights
theory, the Anglo-American philosophy rejected it,

51

focusing on the

final ownership of the copyright of the work. 5 2 The differences in
copyright protection between Anglo-American countries and
continental Europe were initially not a concern because the
trafficking of artistic works during the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries was predominantly domestic. 53 The call for
international copyright protection arose later in the nineteenth

46.
Id. (stating that even if the authors sold their rights to publishers, under
the natural rights approach they always retained their personal or "moral rights").
47.
Id. at 8-9.
48.
Eric B. Hiatt, The "Dirt" on Digital "Sanitizing"-Droit Moral, Artistic
Integrity and the Directors Guild of America v. Cleanflicks et al., 30 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 375, 393 (2004).
49.
See Swack, supra note 2, at 368-70 (categorizing four distinct moral rights).
50.
Burger, supra note 41, at 7.
51.
Swack, supra note 2, at 380-82.
52.
Id.

53.

Alexander A. Caviedes, InternationalCopyright Law: Should The European

Union Dictate Its Development?, B.U. INT'L L.J. 165, 169 (1998).
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century as the level of international trade grew. 54 Works from
different countries were targets of piracy because their authors were
unprotected on an international scale. 55 In 1858, the first
international Congress of Authors and Artists met in Brussels and
laid the groundwork for the drafting and signing of a treaty that
would afford international protection.5 6 The Congress met a few times
afterwards, each time adopting resolutions and asking governments
to join in passing legislation for the international protection of
57
authors.
B. InternationalFocus on Copyright and the Birth of the Berne
Convention
The Congress of Authors and Artists included participants from
58
many different countries and represented a variety of interests.
Subsequently, the Congress evolved into L'Association Litteraire et
Artistique Internationale (the Association).59 The Association
determined that the only way to succeed in protecting copyrights
would be to form a union. Consequently, the Association called a
meeting in 1883 for parties deemed "interested" in the international
union. 60 The meeting convened in Berne, Switzerland, where the
participants drafted a treaty containing ten articles that provided a
foundation for the international treatment of copyright protection. 61
After the completion of the basic formalities of the treaty, the Swiss
government invited others countries to meet in Berne on September
62
8, 1884, to form an international copyright union.
At the Conference of 1884, before discussion of the new draft
began, the German representatives asked whether it might be better
to change from "the national treatment principle in favor of a treaty
that would codify an international law of copyright and establish a
uniform law among all contracting states. '6 3 Although there was
favorable support, many other participating countries did not agree

54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Burger, supra note 41, at 11-15.
57.
Id. The Association also changed its name to L'Association Litteraire et
Artistique Internationale (ALAI). See id. at 11.
58.
Burger, supra note 41, at 11 n.57 (stating that the countries represented
were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
States).
59.
Id. at 11.
60.
Id. at 11-12.
61.
Id. at 12.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
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with the idea.6 4 The speculated reason for the lack of support is that
the countries would have been required to make changes in their
65
domestic laws, which many did not want to implement.
The rejection of the German proposition was significant because
it revealed the participants' differing views of copyright protection.
The Conference attendees segmented into three separate groups
based on their different viewpoints. The first group favored a codified
international law of copyright-universal treatment and law across
each country. 66 The second group comprised countries that wanted
very little universal regulation and as much national independence as
possible. 67 The third group established an intermediate position
between the first two groups. This third group favored a codified
international law but also desired domestic flexibility.6 8 They
supported the idea of universal protection but were weary of the
chaos such a dramatic change would entail.
These differing views of copyright protection began to polarize
the countries as they worked on drafting the treaty. The countries
that favored a universal law argued that the Convention should
protect all authors who published in a union, regardless of their
nationality.6 9 The 1884 draft, however, only protected authors who
were nationals of Union-member countries and publishers within the
Union. 70 As a result, even though the Union-members adopted
universal protection, the countries were free to create exceptions
domestically which caused those countries favoring universal law to
become the least mainstream ideology. It would be the intermediate
group, however, whose ideas would emerge two years later as the
71
mainstream of the Berne Convention of 1 8 8 6 .
C. The Universal Protectionof the Berne Convention of 1886
The Conference of 1886 included ten countries that signed the
Berne Convention and took a significant step towards providing
international and universal protection for authors and artists. 72 The
Convention established the concept of an author's exclusive rights,
which functioned as a minimum standard that all member countries

64.
65.

Id.
Id.

66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 13.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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were required to recognize. 7 3 "The fundamental principle of the Berne
Convention was, and continues to be, national [protection]." 74 The
national protection afforded by the Convention is crucial because the
participating countries could no longer discriminate against foreign
authors. "Berne signatories [must] grant authors who are nationals of
other Berne countries the same protection they accord to their own
citizens." 75 Although this was a victory for artists, it was only one of
the many hurdles to overcome due to the disparities of protection
amongst different countries. The artists' protection extended only
within those participating countries of the Berne Convention. The
next strategy of the union-members was for the Berne Convention to
target and gain additional membership to continue to expand
protections for artists' worldwide.
D. The Contrast between Europeanand Anglo-American Treatment of
Moral Rights
The United States was most likely not a party to the Berne
Convention because of its opposing views on moral rights. Moral
rights (a natural rights approach), as depicted in European countries,
are distinguished from traditional property rights (the AngloAmerican approach). Moral rights derive from French law. 76 The
French view of moral rights extends beyond an author's property
interests to encompass "non-property attributes of an intellectual and
moral character which give legal expression to the intimate bond
which exists between a literary or artistic work and its author's
personality; it is intended to protect his personality as well as his
work. ' 77 Similar to France, Germany employs the term
Urheberpersdnlichkeitsrechtto describe artists' interests, which refers
to a creative artist's right of personality. 78 Both France and Germany
address the fact that an artist places physical embodiments of their
personality into their work. 79 Under the civil law view, moral rights

73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 16.
75.
Id. at 16-17.
76.
See Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and
Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 465-67 (1968).
77.
Id. at 465.
78.
See Brian T. McCartney, "Creepings"and "Glimmers"of the Moral Rights of
Artists in American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 37 (1998) (citing Das
Pers6nlichkeitsrechtim Allgemeinen und im Urheberrecht, 3 ARCH1V FOR URHEBER-,
FILM-, FUNK- UND THEATERRECHT (Germany 1930)). Arthur Katz also translates, das
Urheberpers6nlichkeitsrechtas "the author's (creator's) right of personality." Arthur S.
Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright Law: A Proposal, 24 S. CAL.
L. REV. 375, 390 (1951).
79.
McCartney, supra note 78, at 37.
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are more than simple economic rights. 80 In fact, moral rights are
more than simply "moral preferences; they are legally enforceable
8
rights vested in creative artists." '
In the natural rights view, even after an artist transfers their
economic rights to the work, the artist retains two rights associated
with the work: (1) the right of integrity and (2) the right of
paternity. 82 These two rights alone demonstrate the fundamental
distinction between the United States' utilitarian and economic
approach and the natural rights approach taken in most civil law
countries.
Although the United States enacted limited provisions
embodying both of these ideas, these ideas are clearly distinct in their
purest natural rights form.8 3 First, the right of integrity prevents
alteration that would injure or damage an artist's reputation or
honor.8 4 This right, in effect, is the cloak of protection for an artist's
personality. The right of integrity in its purest form "prohibits the
public presentation of a creative artist's work in a context or manner
harmful to her reputation or contrary to her 'intellectual interests,
personal style, or literary, artistic or scientific conceptions.' '8 5 Under
this protection, the artists retain the privilege of deciding when to
reveal their work and the continuing right to prevent mutilation or
alteration, even after relinquishing their economic rights to the work.
Secondly, the right of paternity is an artist's right to "be publicly
identified with his or her work and to avoid misattribution of
authorship. 8 6 Artists have the right to: (1) have their name
associated with their work, (2) disavow association with a work, and
87
(3) prevent having another's name associated with their work.
These rights illustrate that artists, in a natural rights or civil law
approach to moral rights, have interests in their work that transcend
the physical creation itself and continue even after the transfer of
economic ownership.

80.
81.

Id.
Id.

82.

Id. at 37-38.

83.
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat.
5089, 5128-33 (1990) [hereinafter VARA] (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506).

84.
See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997); see also Katz, supra note 78, at 390-91; Sarraute, supra note
76, at 465-67.

85.
86.
87.

See McCartney, supra note 78, at 38.
Id.
Id.
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In contrast, the United States affords its creators the protection
of copyright law. 8 8 The driving force behind the U.S. copyright law,
however, is a utilitarian motivation. 89 The United States grants
artists' rights to advance the public welfare by providing incentive for
creativity and innovation. 90 In continental Europe, the driving
motivation of copyright law is a derivative of natural rights belonging
to the artist. 9 1 Due to the explicit utilitarian view of the U.S.
Constitution, 92 the U.S. view on copyright protection derives from
economics. 93 Furthermore, the United States does not value an
artist's creative work by its contribution to society or its overall social
utility. Perceived value directly relates to the price that the public is
willing to pay for the work. 94 Thus, the United States does not protect
moral rights as an artist's natural right; rather, artists' rights, which
the United States protects, are for the benefit of the U.S. economy.
The United States has been reluctant to recognize a true moral right.
In fact, where the United States has enacted pieces of the moral
right, they have significantly limited its definition.

III.

THE UNITED STATES' SLOW INDUCTION OF BERNE PRINCIPLES AND

ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH ITS OBLIGATION TO PROTECT MORAL RIGHTS

A. The United States'InitialReluctance to Commit to Berne
Although bills safeguarding artists' moral rights were introduced
in Congress in 1979, they drew little federal support from the
utilitarian-minded members of Congress. 95 The issue of federal
protection of moral rights continued to hang in question as the United
States considered whether to join the Berne Convention. 96 The debate
over whether to join the Berne Convention came down to the

88.

Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under

the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 1203, 1212-13 (2002).
89.
Id. at 1213.
90.
Id. at 1214.
91.
Id. at 1213.
92.
"Congress shall have the Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the
Copyright Clause is the cloak of protection afforded to U.S. artists).
93.
Suhl, supra note 88, at 1214.
94.
Id.; see also Netanel, supra note 7, at 26.
95.
Suhl, supra note 88, at 1213.
96.
Id. at 1212-13.
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controversial issue of whether the United States wanted to provide
97
moral rights protection to artists within its borders.
Members of Congress found themselves facing a massive amount
of conflict when they deliberated the Berne
Convention
Implementation Act. 98 In 1988, after almost a century of indecision,
the United States reluctantly signed the Convention.9 9 Nevertheless,
the United States successfully evaded the issue of moral rights due to
a new
enactment
by Congress.
The Berne
Convention
Implementation Act of 1988100 allowed Congress to side-step the
debate over whether to provide additional protection and recognize
artists' moral rights. The Act stated that the Berne Convention was
not "self-executing" in that "existing law satisfied the United States'
obligations in adhering to the Convention, its provisions are not
enforceable through any action brought pursuant to the Convention
itself, and neither adherence to the Convention nor the implementing
legislation expands or reduces" any rights to claim authorship of a
work or to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of
a work.10 1 Thus, it is likely that the United States only joined the
Berne Convention to ease international criticism for not providing a
10 2
higher standard of protection to its authors and artists.
B. U.S. Compliance through WIPO-TRIPs
The United States initially resisted the idea of moral rights, as
evidenced by the century-long debate over joining the 1886 European
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works. 10 3 Although the United States does not fully protect moral
rights, the United States has made progressive steps in that
direction. In 1967, the United Nations created a Convention
establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as
a specialized agency designed to promote the protection of intellectual
property worldwide.' 0 4 The WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted by the

97.
Id. at 1212.
98.
Id.
99.
Christopher J. Robinson, The "Recognized Stature" Standard In The Visual
Artists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1941 (2000).
100.
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
101.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing S. REP.
NO. 100-352, at 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714-15).
102.
See Suhl, supra note 88, at 1213.
103.
See Burger, supra note 41, at 5; see also Robinson, supra note 99, at 1941
(discussing the United States' slow acceptance of Berne and its development of VARA).
104.
Suhl, supra note 88, at 1212.
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WIPO in 1996, provides additional
protections for copyright necessary
10 5
in the modern information era.
In addition, in 1995, the United States joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO), 10 6 which is an international organization
overseeing a large number of agreements that define the "rules of
trade" between its member nations.10 7 The United States supported
the WTO regarding the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs), which is an international agreement on the
subject of "intellectual property."1 08 The TRIPs agreement covers
areas of law such as copyright, patents, trademarks, trade secrets,
and designs. 10 9 The enactment of TRIPs in 1994 was an
unprecedented and effectively mandatory globalization of intellectual
property law. The TRIPs agreement may be the most important
international agreement on copyright, patents, and other intellectual
property rules the United States has ever supported." 0
In one sweeping move, the TRIPs agreement took many of the
substantive provisions of the main WIPO conventions and created
new measures covering enforcement and dispute settlement. 111
Moreover, by incorporating the substantive rights of the Berne,
Rome, and Paris Conventions, 112 the TRIPs agreement maintained a
minimum level of protection. Furthermore, the TRIPs agreement
established a group of specific rights that serve as a baseline for all
participating members. 113 For example, the TRIPs agreement
required all WTO members to abide by Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention, even if the member never signed the original

105.
Id.
106.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
107.
Id.; see also Wikipedia, World Trade Organization, http://en.wikipedia.org!
wiki/World_..Trade-Organization (discussing the establishment of the WTO) (last
visited Oct. 8, 2005).
108.
Understanding the WTO: The Agreements; Intellectual Property: Protection
and Enforcement, http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto-e/whatise/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm.
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13,
1908, completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at
Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations, done at Rome, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
Rome Convention].
113.
WTO Agreement, supra note 106, pmbl.
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Convention. 114 Therefore, the United States' membership and
involvement in the WTO creates standards the United States must
meet.
C. U.S. Compliance through the Visual Artists Rights Act
In addition to the United States' international obligations, in
1990, Congress also partially embraced the tenets of the Berne
Convention by passing the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA). 115 VARA recognizes the moral rights of attribution and
integrity in the context of a limited class of visual arts and protects
both the reputations of certain visual artists and the works they
create. 116 This Act came two years after Congress decided to
recognize the moral right as an amendment to the Copyright Act of
1976.117 VARA, although narrow, brought the United States closer
into line with much of the European community, where artists have
had protection for their moral rights for many years.
VARA grants artists limited rights of integrity and attribution in
their works of visual art. 118 U.S. artists now have the right to (1)
prevent the use of their names on work they did not create (right of

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

TRIPS, supra note 22, art. 9, at 324.
VARA, supra note 83, at 5128-33.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1995).
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (defining a "work of visual art" as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of two hundred or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author).
The statute specifically excludes as a "work of visual art":
(a)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture, or other audiovisual work, book, magazine,
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service,
electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandizing item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(b) any work made for hire; or
(c) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
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attribution) 1 9 and (2) prevent the "distortion, mutilation, or
modification" of their works under certain circumstances that would
120
be prejudicial to their honor or reputation (right of integrity).
Despite Congress's recognition of these federally-created moral
rights, these specific moral rights are still inferior to those recognized
by the United States' European counterparts. While the enactment of
VARA suggests that America is on its way to recognizing the moral
right of creative artists, VARA has three distinct shortcomings. First,
VARA only protects a specific type of artist. 121 Second, VARA only
protects certain types of art. 12 2 Finally, even if a work meets the
VARA definitions of "visual artist" and "visual art," a number of
exceptions may still prevent the artist from protection. 123 One of the
many exceptions concerns works "made for hire"124-the definition of
a visual art in the Act excludes a "work made for hire. ' 12 5 The
relevant part of the Copyright Act defines a work made for hire as "a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment."'1 26 This exception will effectively exclude most of the
professionals who are seeking to have their work protected. Another
exception is that VARA's right of integrity does not extend to
complete destruction except for works of "recognized stature.'1 2 7 Even

119.
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)-(2) (1990), available at http://www.law.
cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscodel7/usc-sec17 00000106---AOOO-.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2005). The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 added § 106A. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5128. VARA states that, generally, § 106A is to take effect six months after
the date of its enactment; that is, six months after December 1, 1990. Id.
120.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1990), available at http://www.law.cornell.
edu/uscode/htmluscodel7/uscsec_17_00000106---A000-.html
(last visited Oct. 2,
2005).
121.
Id. § 106A(b).
122.
Id. § 106A(c)(3).
123.
Id. § 106A(c)(1)-(3).
124.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 1995).
125.
17 U.S.C. § 101(B) (2002), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/
htmluscodel7/usc sec_17_00000101----000-.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
126.
Id. § 101(1) (citing the specific employee/employer relationship). The idea
behind "work-for-hire," in general, is work that is subject to substantial control by the
person who commissions the work has less connection with the personality of its
creator than in the case of work done independently by an artist. This theory lies in
cases dealing with motion picture films. Often in the United States, there is a
presumption that the director is a "work-for-hire," and that the producer holds the
copyright to the film; in the European view, it is presumed that the director of a film is
an "author" and as such has moral rights in the film. See Cour de cassation [highest
court of ordinary jurisdiction], Cass. le civ., May 28, 1991, 149 R.I.D.A. 197 (deciding
that directors could prevent the unauthorized colorization of black and white films, as
they are violations of moral rights).
127.
VARA provides that an artist "shall have the right to prevent any
destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of that work is a violation of that right." 17 U.S.C.§ 106A(a)(3)(B) (2005),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chapl.html#106a (last visited Oct. 10,
2005).
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setting aside an artists' economic interests, most artists, whether
they are successful or not, presumably would prefer not to have their
work destroyed, even after selling the work. In addition, society is
probably better off by preserving creative works, even for display.
128
Lastly, rights under VARA only endure for the life of the artist.
In contrast, the moral rights in Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention endure after the artist's death or at least until the
expiration of the economic rights. 129 In VARA, Congress deliberately
shortened the duration to the life of the artist. 130 In fact, the Senate
deliberately shortened the duration to the life of the artist alleging
that the more liberal individual states' statutes enabled the United
States to comply with the Berne Convention. 131 Finally, the United
States expressly limited the federal moral rights by the copyright's
fair-use doctrine. 132 This doctrine allows for a variety of exempted
uses, which Congress has decided do not violate an artist's moral
rights.
D. The United States' Defense to Copyright and Moral Rights through
the Fair-Use Doctrine
Despite the United States' recognition of federal integrity and
attribution rights, those rights are significantly more limited than
their European counterparts. In addition to previously discussed
limitations, federal moral rights are also expressly subject to
copyright's fair-use doctrine. 13 3 The fair-use doctrine is an affirmative
defense to copyright infringement. 1 34 Fair-use is a judicially created
defense, which Congress codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of
1976135 and termed an "equitable rule of reason."'136 The fair-use
defense is a limitation on the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,

128.
129.

17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
See Berne Convention, supra note 1.

130.

See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990); see also 136 CONG. REC. H3111, H3112

(daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeir).
131.
132.

136 CONG. REC. 36,948.
136 CONG. REC. H8266, H8270 (1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).

VARA amended § 107 by adding the reference to § 106A. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089, 5132.
133.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
134.
E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (stating
that fair-use is an affirmative defense).
135.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.

136.
E.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (stating
that the fair-use section of the Copyright Act enables courts to "apply an 'equitable rule
of reason' analysis to particular claims of infringement"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 6566 (1976) (noting that the fair-use doctrine "is an equitable rule of reason"); S. REP. No.
94-473, at 62 (1975) (also noting that the fair-use doctrine "is an equitable rule of
reason").
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including reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public performance,
and public display of rights. 137 Reduced to a more basic definition, the
fair-use doctrine permits usage of a work that would otherwise be
infringing, on the grounds that doing so yields a greater public
138
benefit than denying it.
However, determining the scope of when to apply the fair-use
doctrine as a legal defense to infringement is difficult. 1 39 To
determine the fair-use defense in any particular case, Congress
requires that courts consider factors including (1) the purpose of the
use, 140 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the entire work, and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 14 1 The fair-use doctrine attempts to strike a balance between
the dual risks that the United States has been struggling with since
the beginning of copyright: on one side, depriving artists of a
monopoly may reduce their incentive to continue and create, and on
the other, granting a monopoly may reduce the creative ability of
other artists. 14 2 Thus, the factors above are guidelines for courts to
consider in determining whether a use falls under the defense of fairuse and thus is not infringement. The factors, however, are broad and
143
not confining, rigid rules.
The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors of § 107
four times 144 and has consistently given the greatest weight to factors
one and four.145 In applying the first factor, to determine the purpose

137.
17 U.S.C. § 107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A,
the fair use of a copyrighted work..."); id. § 106A(a) ("Subject to section 107...").

138.
Tyler G. Newby, Note, What's Fair Here is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the
American Fair Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1633, 1637 (1999).
139.
See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Congress
established these nonexclusive factors as a guide to courts considering fair use.").
140.
See id. (including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes).
141.
17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4), available at http://www.copyright.gov/title17/
92chapl.html#1-38 (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
142.
Newby, supra note 138, at 1637-38.
143.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). The Report stated that § 107 was
intended to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or
enlarge it in any way." Id.
144.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599-600 (1994)
(holding that commercially distributed parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" might be fair
use); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (holding that incorporation of a
magazine story into commercially distributed movie was not fair use); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (holding that a magazine's
publication of key portions of not-yet-published presidential memoir was not fair use);
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 495-98 (1984) (holding that
noncommercial, private home copying of television programs for the purpose of "timeshifting" is fair use).
145.
Newby, supra note 138, at 1639.

20061

MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STA TES

237

of the use, a court typically finds in favor of fair-use where the
purpose of the infringement was for nonprofit use instead of
commercial use. 146 Even if the use is commercial, however, it may be
found to be a fair use, "so long as it appears that the public will derive
some otherwise inaccessible benefit" 147 from the use. Thus, although
a court may be inclined to find fair-use if the use is not for profit, the
use is not dispositive, but more indicative of a presumption towards a
fair-use defense.
The Court's consideration of the fourth factor-the effect on the
potential market for or value of the work-weighs "not only the
extent of market harm caused by the infringement" but also whether
"unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort ... would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the potential market, for the original
work."' 148 A court's determination of this factor, not surprisingly, often
depends on whether the court found the use to be a commercial
one. 14 9 Courts are more likely to find that the fourth factor weighs
against fair-use if the use of the work was commercial in nature,
especially when the use competes with the original copyrighted
150
work.
Even though the fair-use doctrine is a flexible rule, it is difficult
to apply to the theory of moral rights because moral rights are
inherently incongruous. The fair-use doctrine is an explicit statutory
limitation on U.S. artists' federal moral rights. 15 1 These federal moral
rights, although limited, are still similar to their European
152
personality-based counterparts, codified in the Berne Convention.
Thus, if these federal moral rights are collectively the artists' right of
personality, then they are much more than intellectual property
rights, which can be conferred upon certain users by the fair-use
doctrine. 153 True moral rights are not like property rights, in that
they are transferable to others, even for a limited time, or sold
154
away.

146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 1640.
148.
Id. at 1641 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590).
149.
Id. at 1642.
150.
Id.
151.
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USER'S RIGHTS 171 (1992) ("The moral-rights doctrine is to the author what the
fair-use doctrine is to the user each being a limitation on the monopoly of copyright to
benefit a class of persons favored by the constitutional copyright clause.").
152.
Berne Convention, supra note 1.

153.

Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair

Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 62 (1997) (discussing how federal moral rights and the
fair-use doctrine are incompatible).
154.
Id. at 67.
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E. Gilliam v. American BroadcastingCompanies, Inc. and its Refuge
Under the Lanham Act § 43(a)
Although the concept of moral rights is a recent addition to U.S.
legislation, U.S. courts have acknowledged bits of moral rights. 155
Moral rights were typically cloaked in the "guise of other legal
theories" such as copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy,
defamation, and breach of contract. 156 Artists' moral rights were also
indirectly established by the Lanham Act of 1992,157 which typically
regulated trademark infringement.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act essentially regulates both an
artist's right of attribution and right of integrity.15 8 Fundamentally,
the right of integrity allows an artist to prevent a work's
alteration. 159 Yet, § 43(a)'s definition is narrower: § 43(a) defines
regulation of integrity not as an alteration but as a substantial
change to a work without the artist's permission. 160 The artist's claim
of injury under § 43(a) is based on the credit for the work being
attributed to the artist, who did not give his final authorization, not
based on the work itself being altered. 161 Thus, the Lanham Act
provides that the artist has the right to prevent any public
representation of their work that threatens their reputation. The
Lanham Act essentially protects against modifications of a given
162
work that may affect the public's judgment of the artist.

155.
156.
157.

Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1992):

(a) Civil action.
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
whichis likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such an act.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Suhl, supra note 88, at 1216-26.
See Swack, supranote 2, at 370-72 (categorizing four distinct moral rights).
Suhl, supra note 88, at 1222.
Id.
Id. at 1223.
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The leading precedent in the United States on this issue is
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 16 3 Gilliam held
that ABC's broadcasting of a highly edited version of Monty Python
skits violated § 43(a). 164 The Second Circuit held that ABC's
unauthorized editing substantially changed the skits, allowing the
public to associate the edited skits as Monty Python's original
work. 165 The court's conclusion was that the editing of Monty
Python's skits equated to mutilation and violated the right of the
artist to have the work attributed to him in the form in which he
created it. 16 6 Although Gilliam is a milestone for moral rights
protection in the United States, Gilliam does not represent the
subsequent standard for protection afforded via the right of integrity
16 7
in § 43(a).
According to § 43(a), a plaintiff must prove either actual
consumer confusion or deception in addition to the actual violation of
integrity. 168 Gilliam and its progeny push the courts for an expansive
reading of § 43(a) to enforce the author's "personal right"169 to reject
his work if it has been altered, mutilated, or distorted. 170 In cases
that follow Gilliam, however, courts continuously distinguish cases
on their facts and refuse to read such an expansive theory into
§ 43(a). 171 For example, in Choe v. Fordham University School of
Law, 172 the court explicitly struck down the validity of an Article 6bis
claim for moral rights protection due to the lack of federal
jurisdiction. 173 This example is more representative of U.S. courts'
refusal to offer explicit protection for moral rights under 6bis and
their persistent tendency to distinguish subsequent cases on their
facts. 174 It is unlikely that cases following Gilliam will enforce an
artist's right to reject his work absent gross mutilation.

163.
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
164.
Id.
165.
See Id.
166.
See Id.
167.
Gilliam has yet to be followed.
168.
See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992).
In addition, this is excluding the possibility that the defendant's actions were
intentionally deceptive. Id.
169.
See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-24.
170.
Id. at 24.
171.
See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997); Carter v. HelmsleySpear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995); Choe v. Fordham University School of Law,
920 F. Supp. 44, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, 1997 WL 746444
(S.D.N.Y.Dec. 3, 1997).
172.
Choe, 920 F. Supp. at 44.
173.
Id. at 49.
174.
Id.
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F. Individual States Statutory Compliance Outside of Federal Law
As many as eleven states have enacted moral rights protection
statutes, which aim to cover the rights of paternity and integrity, but
only in certain works. 175 For example in 1979, artists achieved a
small victory when the California State legislature passed the
California Art Preservation Act. 176 Soon after, New York's state
legislature followed California by enacting the Artist's Authorship
Rights Act in 1983.177 Following these highly influential precedents,
nine other states also passed moral rights statutes. 178 Accordingly,
the focus of state statutory laws revolves mainly on the California
and New York approaches. 179 The latter states enacting moral rights
statutes modeled them from either one or the other of those
approaches.1 8 0 Although both approaches emphasize preservation or
attribution, neither approach accounts for the full protection of moral
rights like those established in Europe.
Despite the additional protections afforded by these state
statutes, they have clear shortcomings and, thus, still do not
effectively strengthen
United States' compliance
with its
international obligations. For instance, the protection of a state
statute extends only as far as the state's jurisdiction.1si An artist's
works may be altered outside of the state of creation without being
subject to the protections of the state statutes.18 2 In addition, federal
copyright law preempts most state moral rights legislation where

175.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42116s to -116t (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-56 (West 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 85S (West Supp.
1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1 to -3
(Michie 1995); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.01-.03 (McKinney 1995) [hereinafter
N.Y. LAW]; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 5-62-2 to -6 (1995).
176.
California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 987-89 (Deering 2004).
177.
Artists' Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03
(McKinney 2004).
178.
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995).
179.
See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act:
A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1741 (1984); Sophia Davis, State
Moral Rights Law and the Federal Copyright System, 4 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233,
257-59 (1985); Jane Engdahl, Moral Rights in State Statutes: A Comparison of the
CaliforniaArt Preservation Act and the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, 34
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 203, 240 (1987).
180.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 51:2151-56 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1995); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 §85S (West Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A.1 to -8
(West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73
§§ 2101-2110 (Purdon Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-62-2 to -6 (1995).
181.
Michael E. Horowitz, Note, Artists' Rights in the United States: Toward
Federal Legislation, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 198-99 (1988).
182.
Id.
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coverage overlaps. This is the most serious shortcoming of the states'
statutory regimes since many state laws have provisions for which
there are no equivalents in the federal law.
Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act18 3 describes a two-pronged
test to determine whether the provisions of the Copyright Act
preempt state law.18 4 The first prong states that federal law will not
preempt state law when there is no overlap of protection and the
subject matter does not fall under the scope of the Copyright Act.18 5
The second prong permits states to safeguard rights that are not
"equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
the copyright." 18 6 If, however, the exercise of any of the exclusive
rights under the Copyright Act infringes the state law, then that
state law is preempted.18 7 Despite the additional protections which
states' statutory law provides to artists, it can be difficult to
determine when federal law will preempt those laws. Inherent in
moral rights protection is the protection afforded by copyright and,
therefore, since Congress has constitutional power over copyright,
Congress has the power to truly fulfill our international obligation to
protect moral rights.
G. An Illustrationof the Comparative Weakness of Protection in the
United States
When comparing U.S. law to European law, the weaknesses and
limitations of artist's integrity protection is best exemplified by a case
involving Turner Entertainment's colorization of the black and white
film, The Asphalt Jungle.18 8 In the United States, colorization of a
film creates a derivative work.' 8 9 A legal derivative work is
conditioned upon the will of the copyright owner's exclusive
derivative right. 190 In this case, the film director's heirs protested the

183.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
184.
Eric M. Brooks, Comment, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral
Rights After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1465 (1989).
185.
Id.
186.
Id. at 1466 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1988)).
187.
Id.
188.
See Turner Entertainment Co. v. Huston, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court
of appeal] Versailles, civ. ch., Dec. 19, 1994, No. 68, Roll 615/92, translated in 16 ENT.
L. REP. 3 (1995), available at http://www.peteryu.com/intip/turner.pdf. The French
court held that colorization of U.S. director John Huston's black and white film Asphalt
Jungle by the Turner Company violated Huston's moral rights even though the Turner
Company legally acquired the economic rights of the film. Id.; see also Suhl, supra note
88, at 1226-27.
189.
Suhl, supra note 88, at 1226.
190.
Id.
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colorization. 19 1 U.S. courts held, however, that the heirs did not have
a successful cause of action because, under the film contract, the
director signs away all rights to the producer. 192 The director's heirs
also filed suit in France to prevent a French television station from
broadcasting the colorized version of Asphalt Jungle.193 The French
courts ruled under French law that the director's creative
contribution to the film makes him the author. 194 Under French law,
the director, as author, maintains his moral right of integrity even
after the industry's standard assignment of his rights to the
195
producer.
The holdings of these two decisions from the United States and
France illustrates that U.S. copyright law is a utilitarian economic
approach, consistent with the Anglo-American tradition. While
successful causes of action for moral rights protection under § 43(a)
do exist in cases such as Gilliam, those cases are more representative
of infringement, unfair competition, and mutilation. 196 Thus, it is
evident that moral rights protection, as an artist's natural right to
qualities embodied in his work, is transparent. In the United States
protection of moral rights is primarily for the benefit of market. As
the Asphalt Jungle case demonstrates, the United States, although
purporting to comply with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, does
not provide an artist a broad or consistent means of moral rights
protection. Instead, the United States' protection is quite limited
relative to that afforded by other Berne Convention member
countries.

IV. THE

ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY MOVIE ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON

THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT ARTISTS'
RIGHTS UNDER THE BERNE CONVENTION

A. The Proposalof the Family Movie Act of 2004
Supporters of movie filtering technology in the U.S. House of
Representatives won a victory on July 21, 2004, when the House
Judiciary Committee voted to send the FMA 1 97 to the full House for

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 1226-27.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 26-29 (2d Cir. 1976).
Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004).

20061

MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STA TES

243

consideration. 198 FMA originally passed a House subcommittee by a
vote of eleven to five before its submission to the House Judiciary
Committee.' 99 Representative Lamar Smith introduced the bill to
allow the sale of technology that skips over objectionable material on
DVD movies in the consumer's private household. 200 After receiving
strong support in the House, the FMA went before the Senate where
it also received immediate support from multiple Senators indicating
20 1
that FMA would soon become law.
In fact, on January 25, 2005, the Senate reintroduced an
amended FMA as part of the Family Entertainment and Copyright
20 2
Act of 2005, which was comprised of four independent bills.
Senator Orrin Hatch initiated the process, and the Family
Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005203 was unanimously
approved by the Senate. 20 4 Recently, Representative Smith
reintroduced the bill to the House where the Judiciary Committee
reviewed it and cleared it for the White House on April 19, 2005.205
Representative Smith was the initial sponsor of the original bill in
June 2004 and has been faithfully advocating filtration technology for
parents that want to shield children from violence, sex, and profanity
in movies. 20 6 The FMA created a narrowly defined safe-harbor for
distributors of such technologies. 20 7 Specifically, the FMA stated that
distributors would not face liability for copyright or trademark
infringement, as long as they complied with the requirements of the

198.
H.R. Rep. No. 108-670, at 39 (2004), 2004 WL 2045264, available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/108-670.pdf.
199.
Backgrounder on the Family Movie Act, http://www.grassfire.org/39/
backgrounder.asp.
200.
Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004).
201.
151 CONG. REC. S450 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/record.xpd?id=109-s20050125-39&bill=slO9-158
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2005).
202.
Brian Franks, New Bill Looks to Combat Piracy, THE SIGNAL (Santa
Clarita, California), Jan. 27, 2005, available at http://www.the-signal.com/
News/ViewStory.asp?storyID=6337 (stating that the four independent bills are: the
ART act, the Family Movie Act, the National Film Preservation Act and the
Preservation of Orphan Works Act).
203.
Press Release, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Hatch Introduces Family
Entertainment Act, Jan. 25, 2005, http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Press
Releases.Detail&PressReleaseid=1267 &Month=1 &Year=2005.
204.
Senate Approves Copyright Bill, TECH LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 1, 2005,
availableat http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2005/20050201.asp.
205.
Id.; see also Summary & Status for the
109th
Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binbdquery/z?d109:SNOO167:@@@L&summ2=m&
(listing a
timeline for all major actions concerning the bill).
206.
Senate Approves Copyright Bill, supra note 204.
207.
Press Release, supra note 203.
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Act. 208 On April 27, 2005, the President signed the FMA, and it
became law.

2

09

FMA creates a new exemption in § 110(11) of the Copyright Act
for skipping and muting content in motion pictures during playback
of an authorized copy of the motion picture in a household. 210 The
new language exempts specified conduct from copyright infringement
and amends § 32 of the Trademark Act of 1946211 by adding a new
section. 212 The newly appended § (3)(A) states "[a]ny person who
engages in the conduct described in paragraph (11) of § 110 of title
17,213 United States Code, and who complies with the requirements
set forth in that paragraph is not liable on account of such conduct for
a violation of any right under this Act. '214 Section 110(11) protects,
(11)(A) the making of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion
picture imperceptible by or for the owner or other lawful possessor of an
authorized copy of that motion picture in the course of viewing of that work for
private use in a household, by means of consumer equipment or services that(i) are operated by an individual in that household;
(ii) serve only such household; and
(iii) do not create a fixed copy of the altered version; and
(B) the use of technology to make such audio or video content imperceptible
215
that does not create a fixed copy of the altered version.

In this amended bill, even an advertisement qualifies under the
Copyright Act as a "motion picture," and thus a product or service
that enables the skipping of an entire advertisement would be beyond
the scope of the exemption. 216 Moreover, the phrase "limited portions"
refers to portions that are both quantitatively and qualitatively

208.
209.
Stat. 218.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)-(b)(2005).
Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004).
Id. (stating that exemption will apply to

(11)(A) the making of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion
picture imperceptible by or for the owner or other lawful possessor of an
authorized copy of that motion picture in the course of viewing of that work for
private use in a household, by means of consumer equipment or services that(i) are operated by an individual in that household;
(ii) serve only such household; and
(iii) do not create a fixed copy of the altered version.).
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 which states '[m]otion pictures are audiovisual
works consisting of a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart
an impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.").
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insubstantial in relation to the work as a whole. 217 The enacted FMA
differs from the version passed by the House in 2004 in that it adds
two "savings clauses,"2 18 only one of which is applicable to copyright
law:
The copyright savings clause makes clear that there should be no
spillover effect from the passage of this law: that is, nothing shall be
construed to have any effect on rights, defenses, or limitations on rights
granted under title 17, other than those explicitly provided for in the
219
new section 110(11) exemption.

At the heart of the FMA is an attempt to clarify the legality of movie
filtering in the privacy of households and create a legalized parental
control option in DVD-players.
B. ClearPlay'sNew Technology Finds Protection under the Family
Movie Act of 2005
FMA alleviates any liability for companies such as ClearPlay,
Inc. 22 0 ClearPlay is a company that sells filtration technology for
DVD-players, which enables the removal of PG-13 and R-rated
material from hundreds of popular movies.2 2 1 After purchasing a
DVD-player equipped with ClearPlay's filtration technology,
customers can purchase specific filters created by ClearPlay for
individual movies at a cost of $7.95 per month. 222 To create a filter,
the ClearPlay staff identifies content that generally falls under the
categories of graphic violence, sexual content, and language. 223 After
the customer installs a filter, the DVD-player will either
automatically skip or mute specific scenes based on fourteen different
22 4
customizable settings used by the customer.
Proponents of ClearPlay and related services argue that motion
picture fans have become increasingly concerned about offensive
movie content.2 25 The purported need for this filtering software
reflects the fact that parents must actively remember to manually
turn down the volume of movies playing objectionable content or skip
past entire scenes with objectionable content. 22 6 ClearPlay states that

217.
Press Release, supra note 203.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
ClearPlay Services, supra note 16.
221.
Id.
222.
Postings of ClearPlay's subscription choices, http://www.clearplay.com
shopcart.aspx (last visited Nov 9, 2005).
223.
ClearPlay Services, supra note 16.
224.
Id.
225.
Family Movie Act of 2004, H.R. 4586, 108th Cong. (2004).
226.
Id.

246

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39..217

their filtration technology simply strengthens the ability of parents
who already filter out content that they believe is inappropriate. 2 27
Parents see the number of entertainment sources steadily increasing
and diluting their overall ability to control their children's
exposure. 228 When Representative Smith introduced the bill in the
House, he stated, "[f]ortunately, technology exists that shields
children from violence, sex and profanity. It is the electronic
equivalent of fast-forwarding over unwanted content. '229 Both
Representative Smith and Senator Orrin Hatch favored the FMA,
which created an exemption in the copyright laws to ensure
companies such as ClearPlay are not sued for copyright or trademark
infringement. 23 0 Senator Hatch also claimed that the bill would end
costly litigation and ensure the "viability of small companies like
ClearPlay, which are busy creating innovative technologies for
consumers that allow them to tailor their home viewing experience to
their own individual or family preferences. ' 231 Accordingly, Congress
enacted FMA and bolstered the rights of individuals to view movies in
a private setting with parental control features on personal DVDplayers.
Critics argue that content filtering companies like ClearPlay
only focus on parental control as a ploy. 232 Specifically, critics charge
that companies such as ClearPlay sell to the public for profit, not
morality. 233 Recently, ClearPlay felt the wrath of its critics when the
major motion picture industry felt entitled to a portion of ClearPlay's
profits. ClearPlay and other companies that comprise this niche were
sued in September 2002 by eight Hollywood movie studios, sixteen
prominent directors, and the Directors Guild of America for both
copyright and trademark infringement. 234 The plaintiffs claimed that
companies like ClearPlay illegally profit from selling software that
essentially edits movies that they neither created, nor owned any
235
rights to.

227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Jesse J. Holland, Bill on DVD Filtering on Fast-Forward, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Feb. 3, 2005.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
DGA v. Clean Flicks, et al., DGA AGENCY UPDATE, Fall 2002, at 2,
http://www.dga.org/dga members/agencyupdates/agency-update.fall-2002.pdf
(publication of the Director's Guild of America, Los Angeles, California).
233.
Id.
234.
Derivative Rights, Moral Rights, and Movie Filtering Technology: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProperty of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 22-26 (2004) (statement of Bill Aho, CEO of ClearPlay,
Inc.), availableat http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/1O8th/93773.pdf.
235.
DGA v. Clean Flicks, et al., supra note 232.
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Long before this suit began, the opponents of ClearPlay claimed
that no other company or individual had the right to sell
unauthorized versions of motion pictures. 236 In fact, opponents of
ClearPlay argued that directors should always have the opportunity
to participate in any editing of their work. 237 For example, directors
previously worked with airline vendors and cable networks to create
more family friendly versions of their work. 238 Furthermore, the
plaintiffs pointed out that after editing a film, they would often
license the edited versions of the film and that they were willing to
license such films to ClearPlay and similar companies. 239 Thus,
opponents of companies like ClearPlay stated that they are not
against family-friendly versions of films that utilize modern
technology. ClearPlay's opponents, however, objected to allowing
private companies to profit by offering "an edited, abridged version of
a movie without regard for the wishes of the director who created the
movie" and without input from the studio or current copyright
240
owner.
Opponents of ClearPlay also contest arguments such as those
posed by Senator Hatch and Representative Smith that ClearPlay
technology was a necessary tool for family-friendly movies. The
opposition countered such arguments by stating that consumers can
simply elect not to view certain movies 2 41 and that the motion picture
industry already has a voluntary rating system to help families
choose appropriate movies. 242 The rating system indicates the level of
sexual or violent content and the target audience age on every motion
243
picture released in the theater, on DVD, or VHS.
There were opponents to Congress' enactment of FMA and its
carved out exception for companies like ClearPlay. In fact, there was
and still remains litigation whose outcome will now be affected by the
enactment of the FMA. While ClearPlay claims that its technology is

236.
Michael Apted, President'sLetter, DGA MAGAZINE, May 2004, available at
http://www.dga.org/news/v29-1/dept-prezreport-504.php3.
237.
Id.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
Hearing on H.R. 4586, supra note 15, at 67-70 (statement of Jack Valenti,
President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Ass'n of America).
241.
Id. at 9 (statement of Marybeth Peters:
I cannot accept the proposition that not to permit parents to use such products
means that they are somehow forced to expose their children (or themselves) to
unwanted depictions of violence, sex, and profanity. There is an obvious
choice-one which any parent can and should make: don't let your children
watch a movie unless you approve of the content of the entire movie.)(emphasis
added).
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
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lawful under the Copyright Act, others allege that the technology is
an infringement and that the FMA is unconstitutional. Though the
case is pending, it is likely that ClearPlay's software will be deemed a
legal, non-infringing, fair-use of the motion pictures as long as they
do not physically copy or alter the DVDs based on the FMA's
exception to the Copyright Act. 244 Nevertheless, this ruling and the
passage of the FMA will have domestic policy245implications and
remains highly inconsistent with European views.
C. Where Does the U.S. Law Stand and Does it Comply with U.S.
InternationalObligations?
While moral rights protection in the United States is consistently
weaker than that of European countries, it attempts to comply with
the minimum standards of its international obligations. "The future
of our creative industry . . .depends on the ability of the U.S. trade
negotiators to persuade other nations to respect our copyrights by
strictly complying with their international obligations under the
Berne Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty. ' 246 The problem
with legislation such as the FMA is that it violates principles of
artistic freedom and expression. Even though the United States'
federally-enacted moral rights do not protect an artist's personality
rights, the law does at least recognize the concept of protecting
artistic freedom. 247 The National Endowment for the Arts, whose

244.
Drew Clark, Bowdlerizing for Columbine? Why American directors have no
moral rights to their movies, SLATE, Jan. 20, 2003, http://slate.msn.com/id/2077192/.
This is also due to the affirmation that the FMA has seen in both houses of Congress
and now placed in the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005. Furthermore,
ClearPlay is consistently distinguished from similar companies such as CleanFlicks
and MovieMask, which physically alter the motion picture. See id.
245.
Press Release, Federation of European Film Directors, FERA Defends the
Creative Rights of Every Nation (Oct. 18, 2002), available at http://www.aidaa.org
feralcdep/181002en.html. This article states that the current stage of U.S. legislation
supporting FMA is exploitation. Id. It further states that FMA would allow destruction
of moral rights by allowing hundreds of films, distributed on DVD in American
markets and on the internet, which are censured for commercial reasons, by publishing
companies who edit the films without the permission of either their authors or of the
U.S. studios that own them. Id.
246.
Hearingon H.R. 4586, supra note 15, at 69.
247.

See NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, STRATEGIC PLAN: FY2003-2008,

at 3 (2003) (stating the concept that "[airtistic work and freedom of expression are a
vital part of any democratic society"), http://www.nea.gov/about/Strategic/FY2OO32008StrategicPlan.pdf; see also SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION: 1886-1986

456 (1997):
Any author, whether he writes, paints, or composes, embodies some part of
himself-his thoughts, ideas, sentiments and feelings-in his work, and this
gives rise to an interest as deserving of protection as any of the other personal
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mission is to strengthen the arts throughout the United States, 248
seeks to preserve works of art and believes that part of the
preservation is to ensure artists are involved in the portrayal of their
creations. 249 Thus, allowing companies to use technology such as
ClearPlay's to edit motion pictures and sell them for profit without
the permission of the copyright owner greatly weakens the United
States' already fragile compliance with international obligations.
ClearPlay's technology alters how audiences perceive the artist's
work. This altered perception of an artist's work is a clear breach of
the U.S. obligations to protect moral rights.
Failure to adequately protect the exclusive right of copyright owners to
authorize the making of derivative works and the rights of authors
would violate U.S. obligations under the Berne Copyright Convention.
Moreover, a breach of the obligation relating to derivative works would
be actionable under the WTO TRIPS provisions, which might result in
250
sanctions.

The enactment of the FMA undermines the U.S. obligations in
international treaties, discourages foreign artists from publishing
their works in the United States, and results in protection of
censorship in the U.S. media. 251 International obligations to empower
artists should have swayed Congress to reject the FMA and enforce a
European-style moral right-the right to force their audience to
experience the art as the artist intended.
Moral rights protection in the United States is consistently
weaker than the protection afforded by European nations. In the
United States, artists have the ability to bring claims under the
Lanham Act, just as directors and studios did against ClearPlay,
which provides artists with at least some means to protect their
federal moral rights. In fact, the rights afforded through § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act were the primary reason that Congress decided U.S. law
met its moral rights obligations defined in the Berne Implementation

interests protected by the institutions of positive law, such as reputation, bodily
integrity, and confidences. The interest in question here relates to the way in
which the author presents his work to the world, and the way in which his
identification with the work is maintained.
248.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 8; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2005); 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2005).
249.
Hearing on H.R. 4586, supra note 15, at 69.
250.
251.
In fact, many critics of the FMA argue that it was enacted to protect
censorship. See Majorie Heins, BLEEP: Censoring Hollywood?, CENSORSHIP NEWS
ONLINE, Summer 2005, http://www.ncac.org/cen-news/cn98bleep.htm ("Censorship
under the guise of child protection has traditionally been, and continues to be, a
convenient excuse for not educating children-about media, critical thinking, and
moral values.").
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Act. 2 5 2

The enactment of the FMA, however, severely limits the artist
or copyright owner's ability to bring a claim against infringers and
violators of their moral rights. This limitation directly conflicts with
the stated obligations under the Berne Convention that an "author
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
253
any distortion, mutilation or other modification" thereof.
Accordingly, it is one thing to say that an individual, in the privacy of
their own home, should be able to filter out undesired content from a
motion picture if they choose to do so by, for example, fast-forwarding
through an illicit scene. It is another issue altogether to say that the
U.S. government freely exempts private companies from federal law
to allow such companies to commercially market a product that alters
254
a director's artistic vision.
The focus of the FMA is not to exempt modifications done with
the permission of the director or owner. Instead, the FMA creates an
exemption to U.S. federal trademark and copyright laws for
companies to profit by selling adaptations of another owner or artist's
motion picture, better known in FIA as filtering.2 55 This legislation
clearly violates an artist's right of integrity and is unconstitutional.
Congress cannot permit editing of an artist's work without the
permission of the artist or the owner of the copyright, without
essentially vitiating freedom of expression and control of derivative
works.2 56 Hence, the United States should stop disguising what is in
effect a blatant disregard for its international obligations under
multiple treaties. If the United States continues to act autonomously,
it should stop pretending to be in compliance with its international
obligations. After passing the FMA, the United States ignored its
international obligations and disregarded its responsibility to foreign
artists and authors who wish to publish works in the United States.
The United States has taken a grave step away from protecting moral
rights and has significantly weakened an artist's ability to make sure
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that the relevant audience will view the artist's work as was
intended. The United States should withdraw from the Berne
Convention and let artists and authors of the world know that their
visions will not be protected but will be susceptible to alterations.
Thus, withdrawing from the Berne Convention would be a
responsible action and would put unsuspecting artists on notice of the
risks they take in publishing works in the United States.

V. CONCLUSION

Moral rights protection is limited in the United States and the
only viable federal course of action for authors and artists is through
the Lanham Act. Unfortunately, the Lanham Act only protects
against consumer deception in the market and does nothing to protect
an artist or author's creativity. Hence, authors only receive protection
in the United States where overt mutilations change the character of
the work and present a false designation of the work's origin.
Moreover, mutilation that does not confuse the public's view of its
origin would not be actionable under the Lanham Act. By enacting
the FMA through the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2005, companies such as ClearPlay can now legally create derivative
works that stem from alterations of motion pictures without any
consequences. This exemption from the law essentially changes the
level of U.S. protection of moral rights from minimal to almost
nonexistent, especially in comparison to the protection afforded by
other Berne Convention member countries.
Congress's recent support of the Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of 2005 indicates that the United States will have
trouble complying with its international obligations on moral rights,
particularly its obligation under the Berne Convention to comply with
Article 6bis. Under Article 6bis, all member countries must enforce
that the "author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification"
thereof.2 57 For true compliance with the Berne Convention, U.S. law
has to depart from its utilitarian, economically-driven tradition and
provide protection to authors in a manner consistent with the other
member countries. The enactment of FMA, however, weakens the
already minimal protection offered by the United States to artists
under the Berne Convention. Furthermore, the TRIPs agreement
requires all WTO members to abide by Articles 1 through 21 of the
Berne Convention, even if they never joined the original
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convention. 258 Therefore, the United States' membership and
involvement in the WTO should have established a floor from which
their obligation extended.
The enactment of the FMA increases the chance that both
domestic and foreign artists could have their works altered despite
the fact that it may completely change the meaning behind their
creations. By failing to comply with our stated international
obligations, the United States will likely find that artists are
discouraged from producing a progressive and creative final product
for fear of its manipulation, modification, and censorship. The United
States will also likely find some type of backlash from the complying
members of other WTO members or Berne Convention signatories.
Therefore, the United States should act preemptively and simply
withdraw as a party to the Berne Convention. Accordingly, the
United States should also be ready to accept sanctions that may stem
from violation of the TRIPs agreement.
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